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CULTURE BEYOND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Applying the Human Terrain System to Peace Operations

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The term “human terrain” includes all aspects of population, culture and human interaction within an area of military operations. The U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System and the Human Terrain Teams of which it is composed, utilize this information to compile detailed studies of its direct applicability to military considerations to provide an operational commander with a more robust and informed understanding of his operating environment. This is especially critical in peace operations, where cultural considerations bear heavily on every aspect of an operation, and interaction with the local populace and key leadership is essential to mission success. The ability of the Human Terrain Team to collect, analyze and interpret socio-cultural data, evaluate courses of action and measure of effectiveness, provide context for intelligence efforts and actively participate in the military decision-making process are key functions of which every operational peace force commander must be aware. The use of human terrain information will optimize planning efforts, ensure attainment of the fundamentals of peace operations, and maximize the effectiveness of peace force tasks. Thus, the application of human terrain concepts to peace operations will allow peace forces to achieve the greatest possible effectiveness and most lasting results.

CULTURE BEYOND COUNTERINSURGENCY

APPLYING THE HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM TO PEACE OPERATIONS

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have called much attention in recent years to the study of counterinsurgency, with a corresponding increase in the interest paid to the role of the general population within an area of military operations. This population and the cultural and sociological considerations attendant upon it have collectively come to be known as “Human Terrain.” While the concept is not as new as many believe, the development and application of processes to understand and make use of this factor have seen a dramatic resurgence of late. In the current incarnation of this initiative as the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS), the application of socio-cultural knowledge has proven effective in helping to prosecute counterinsurgency operations. The prudent operational commander will strive to understand and utilize the tools provided by HTS across the full range of military operations. Peace operations (PO), which are highly sensitive to cultural considerations, share many similarities with counterinsurgency operations. By understanding and applying the concepts and principles of HTS, operational commanders will maximize their efficiency and effectiveness in conducting peace operations.

BACKGROUND

The creation of HTS was partly the result of an article by Dr. Montgomery McFate in which she argued that the understanding of an adversary’s culture is critical to waging an effective counterinsurgency operation.¹ This article coincided with requests from units in the field, and the Army quickly recognized that people, and indeed entire populations, form a cultural and

sociological environment, or “human terrain,” in which troops must effectively operate. Doctrine now recognizes that an understanding of this terrain is at least as critical as understanding the enemy himself.² As a result, HTS was developed in 2006 to provide direct socio-cultural support to military units through the assignment of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) to operational commanders. These teams employ social science experts such as anthropologists and sociologists who are attached to, and embedded in, operational units.³

Peace Operations (POs) may involve either Peace Enforcement (PE) or Peacekeeping (PK), but typically begin in either case once an armistice or truce has been agreed upon by warring factions. Once that peace agreement is made, a foreign peace force is called upon to provide security and stability as the belligerent parties transition to a viable and lasting post-conflict period. It is also critical to consider the underlying nature of the conflict, as this can be a significant complicating factor. For example, the divisive issues at the heart of a conflict between sovereign nations may be vastly different from the issues at the heart of a revolutionary type of civil war within a single sovereign nation. Accordingly, the deeper origins of these issues may be influenced either more or less by inter-cultural considerations, such as tribal rivalries, religious attitudes or cultural values. Understanding these sources of conflict is clearly crucial to implementing a successful strategy to contain and redress the conflict. The majority of these operations are conducted under the auspices of United Nations actions, of which the U.S. is a major force contributor. However, joint doctrine reminds us that peace operations may also be conducted within coalitions of nations, or even with the U.S. as a sole actor.⁴ Thus it is important that all operational commanders be aware of the critical resources available through HTS to most effectively conduct these types of engagements.

Maintaining peace in unstable situations, where tensions are high and stability is tenuous, can depend strongly on the personalities of belligerent leaders and cultural sensitivities of the societies involved. This is especially true, as both these sensitivities and personalities inform each belligerent's perceptions, and thus the level of trust and confidence, each harbors toward the other.⁵ These personal dynamics played a pivotal role, for example, in the UN peace mission in Sudan, when the death of First-Vice President Garang resulted in the dissolution of peace efforts. It quickly became clear that only his strong personal leadership, rather than real societal commitment to the peace process, had been the guiding force until that time.⁶ An understanding of the human terrain, and particularly the dynamics of human interaction at the most basic, local level, is necessary. This is precisely what Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are designed to provide.⁷

PLANNING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

All military operations must begin with a robust planning process, and peace operations are no exception. The use of HTS tools and systems will provide the commander the necessary information to make the best possible decisions in any given operational environment. The socio-cultural information provided by the HTTs is pivotal to forming a complete and accurate understanding of the operating environment, determining relevant informational and intelligence requirements, and preparing operational plans appropriate to the human terrain in which they will be executed. Furthermore, the products provided by HTTs fill an informational need that is not currently met by other available sources.

HTTs assist the operational commander by acquiring and interpreting relevant information to provide insight to the culture of the general population as it applies to forming and influencing the operating environment.⁸ In that it is distinct in purpose and function from

military intelligence, for which it could be confused – and sometimes is – by critics. A key distinction should not be missed, which strikes directly to the heart of understanding what HTS is and what it is not – the degree of focus each places on the adversary. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) focuses on the inclinations, preparations, and expected actions of the adversary as relevant to military operations.⁹ Quite differently, cultural preparation of the environment (CPOE), a key function of HTS, focuses on understanding the environment in which those military operations will be undertaken.¹⁰

During the operation, intelligence becomes heavily focused on enemy targeting, whereas the application of human terrain knowledge has little to do with targeting. In fact, to the contrary, HTTs are actively engaged in identifying alternative courses of action that require fewer and less-kinetic means.¹¹ In other words, IPB is conducted through the channels of military intelligence, and is highly enemy-centric. Conversely, CPOE is provided by HTTs, and is instead population-centric. Since peace operations are not conducted against entire populations, but rather against the bad actors, or “spoilers,” this is a crucial distinction. Further, it is important to remember that the human element is not a static terrain feature, but is constantly changing,¹² and the rate of change is likely to be even greater during periods of exceptional stress or turmoil on the population. This level of stress, turmoil, and indeed uncertainty is to be expected during conditions of violent conflict and fragile security.

As the terrain shifts with the conflict, so shall the context by which information is collected and interpreted, and this requires periodic updating of the commander’s common operational picture (COP) as informed by the CPOE.¹³ This cultural preparation lays the foundational context by which all other planning and intelligence is conducted, understood and applied. In fact, before the advent of HTS, it was observed by Major General Michael

Flynn, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence with the International Security Forces, Afghanistan, that “analysts throughout the intelligence hierarchy lack the necessary context”¹⁴ to apply to the collection process to properly plan for relevant information requirements in the sorts of culturally-sensitive operating environments military forces are seeing today. Colonel Jeffrey Sinclair and two members of the HTT with which he has worked have observed that an understanding of local history, specifically with regard to tribes and their mutual interactions, provided exactly the sort of context necessary to accurately understand the information being collected.¹⁵

It is essential that information gathering during the planning stage be operationally relevant¹⁶ to optimize the use of limited or shared resources and to avoid mistaken assumptions or information overload. This idea applies equally to the planning stage on through to the eventual termination of operations. HTTs conduct initial CPOE as a contribution to the planning process, and on a continuing basis to further ensure that human terrain information remains relevant for the duration. These teams assist in the development of Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) to identify essential considerations relating to the human terrain,¹⁷ and determine where critical information gaps may exist or are likely to develop.¹⁸ It is important that commanders plan from the beginning of the process to ensure a continuous flow of information pertaining to the population and the dynamics of it, and to do this, HTTs continually monitor and assess events as they unfold. This allows them to provide recommendations for relevant and appropriate adjustments where necessary, and thus to help optimize the effectiveness of military operations.¹⁹

The use of experts from within specialized professional fields lends several deeper advantages to the employment of HTTs, especially as compared to organic military assets,

such as civil affairs units, that may also be available. The first advantage accrues as a result of the academic backgrounds of the team members, who possess graduate level degrees and professional training and field experience in relevant fields of study. This academic and professional recognition demonstrates that they possess the tools and methods to conduct the type of detailed research study required to truly understand the intricacies of a foreign population. While the U.S. military has attempted to fill this gap with Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), that program has proven somewhat ineffective due to such failings as poorly coordinated deployments and the inability of FAOs to maintain specialized proficiency due to career advancement concerns.²⁰ Second, these team members have credibility²¹ – as has been astutely and correctly observed, “in all cultures, old age is synonymous with wisdom.”²² Whether right or wrong, the suggestions of a 60 year-old academic will carry more weight than will the advice of an 18 year-old soldier in a civil affairs unit. The benefit of this credibility will manifest even more critically in situations where HTT members must collect data or form relationships through direct interaction with members or leaders of the local public.

ACHIEVING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Joint doctrine for United States Armed Forces defines fifteen fundamental principles for the successful conduct of PO. Applying the knowledge and expertise provided by HTS and its HTTs will maximize the ability of an operational commander to accomplish these principles. These fundamental concepts are affirmed by numerous historical studies into peacekeeping operations at multiple levels, and of them, four stand out as being the most directly influenced by cultural considerations. For a PO to achieve the best results, peace forces must

demonstrate impartiality between the belligerent parties to the conflict, do so respectfully, and provide security by applying restraint and the minimum use of force.

Impartiality takes many forms depending upon the specific requirements of the situation in which the peace forces are placed, but the initial stages of an operation present the operational commander with the first opportunity to make a lasting impression on the belligerent parties and the local populations. The choice of where to deploy peace forces, especially when working with a multi-national or multi-ethnic peace force, is critical. Dependent upon the situation, and possibly also the root causes of the conflict, it may be inappropriate or counterproductive to deploy personnel of disparate ethnic, religious, cultural or racial backgrounds to certain areas.²³ In an analysis of UN peacekeeping operations in the Sudan region, it was noted that the UN force commanders rarely gave much thought to these factors,²⁴ in that they deployed Western troops to Arab-dominated areas which would have been more receptive to native African troops. As a result, the UN peace force earned a perception of partiality amongst the population due to the religious attitudes of the soldiers deployed to various locales. There, a commander could have made optimal use of a study of cultural geography, provided by a HTT as one of the fundamental reports they are prepared to provide.²⁵ Combined with a detailed analysis of demographics,²⁶ also provided by the HTT, a commander will be able to deploy his forces with more sensitivity to the populace by becoming informed as to how prevailing beliefs and attitudes might bear on their perception of his forces.

In addition to impartiality, as informed by the CPOE, peacekeepers must be ever mindful of demonstrating respect²⁷ for members of the belligerent parties and their general populations. This can be a difficult and sensitive matter, and commanders must find a

balance between military considerations to ensure the fulfillment of their mandate, while also avoiding the pitfall of applying ethnocentric ideas of correctness or propriety to the internal workings of a foreign population or political structure.²⁸ It is counterproductive to create friction or open hostility, so peace forces must avoid creating new biases, particularly against themselves. This exact problem was, unfortunately, rather typical in the UN peace operation in Sudan (UNMIS), where the appointed leader, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN (SRSG) Jan Pronk routinely and publicly criticized the people around him, including the Sudanese he was tasked to work with. Yet, under customary Sudanese usage such criticism was unacceptable, and as a result, the SRSG forfeited his personal credibility, and with it support for the PO as a whole.²⁹

The foundations for a peace force's ability to demonstrate the proper respect and impartiality are laid at the very outset of operations, by properly training troops for the operating environment in which they are deployed. Heed must be paid to cultural considerations, because in this "great melting pot" we call America, the traditional approach to cultural diversity is to diminish or ignore our differences while accentuating our similarities in an attempt to absorb newcomers into our way of life.³⁰ However, to members of other populations in which troops carry out PO, such an attitude may be perceived as a feeling of superiority, which would be negatively received, as the U.S. Marine Corps acknowledged long ago in their "Small Wars Manual."³¹ In a PO where troops will be dispersed among the population, even the most junior will likely have direct contact with the general population. That characteristic, as distinct from major combat operations, makes it essential that all members of the peace force are aware of cultural considerations appropriate to their positions and assigned duties.³²

Human terrain teams are assigned the essential task of providing training for military personnel, and this can include anything from general socio-cultural background on the operating environment to specific awareness training during religious holidays and festivals. For leaders at appropriate levels, it could include training on such topics as tribal dynamics, leadership structures and local social customs.³³ Servicemembers at ever lower levels are frequently placed in positions to be unofficial “ambassadors” of the United States through their actions in situations that might seem trivial if viewed through the lens of a traditional total war mentality. This makes it incumbent upon leaders at all levels to ensure that the men and women under their command have the knowledge to behave appropriately. By incorporating timely and locally-relevant information developed by HTTs into the training process, and by allowing the expert social scientists of the HTTs conduct that training, commanders will set their troops – and their operations – up for success.

The final two fundamentals for success in PO are restraint and minimum use of force,³⁴ which are critical in these operations for the degree in which their application bears directly upon the public perception of the peace force. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated, “Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented...”³⁵ In PO, the term “spoilers” refers to someone who seeks to derail the peace process. The use of excessive force plays directly to these spoilers by providing material such as civilian casualties or property damage as propaganda to recruit others to their cause.³⁶ In differentiating the two fundamental concepts, “restraint” refers to the actions of individual soldiers when in contact with the

enemy, and is related primarily to training at the tactical level. Alternately, “minimum use of force” is considered when evaluating potential courses of action.

Situations will arise in which the use of force seems necessary, otherwise there would be no need for an armed peace force, yet the commander must remain open to alternatives. At the operational level, the employment of a HTT aids the commander in employing minimum force, particularly in cases where traditional military planning process focuses on kinetic, or violent, methods. The mission essential tasks of a HTT include proposing non-lethal courses of action (COAs) during the planning process, as well as giving voice to the concerns, perceptions and possible reactions of the general population during the wargaming process.³⁷ These contributions assist in identifying and evaluating methods that employ less military force, or perhaps eliminate it altogether, in favor of non-kinetic methods. These non-lethal courses of action build the trust of the population by portraying the soldiers as a peace force rather than invaders, thus defusing the potential creation of propaganda materials for the cause of spoilers.

ACCOMPLISHING THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF THE PEACE FORCE

In addition to achieving the fundamental principles, the peace force must conduct effective operations to maintain the peace. The use of socio-cultural knowledge provided by HTTs will allow the operational commander to achieve optimal results during the actual execution of military operations. Of the myriad tasks that may be performed in a typical PO, the most common are to isolate spoilers from the general population, conduct necessary disarmament, provide the atmosphere to allow conflict resolution, and communicate effectively with the population. Taken collectively, these functions form the bedrock for the provision of general security.

The first essential component of the security function is to identify and isolate the spoilers from the population, and this is highly dependent upon public support already gained. Once the peacekeepers have earned their trust, it is the members of the local population that will best recognize the bad elements among them far better than any foreign forces.³⁸ In Operation Support Hope, begun in 1994 in response to atrocities in Rwanda, it was discovered that even the refugee camps were being infiltrated by extremists who had committed, and in some cases were continuing to commit, genocide.³⁹ Unfortunately, there is a gap between being aware of the presence of spoilers and being able to identify them in order to take action. This example clearly demonstrates a situation where direct engagement with the population would be the shortest route to solving that problem. Direct engagement is a key function of HTTs, and is one they routinely perform during such actions as civic medical programs and humanitarian assistance. Unfortunately, directly engaging the locals in this way could also open them up to retaliation from the bad elements,⁴⁰ but that possibility can also be at once recognized and then rectified by a member of a HTT.

Identification of the spoilers is clearly necessary, but is only the first step, and the methods of HTS can also help with the process of isolating them from the population and their ability to exert a negative influence. As impartiality is one of the fundamentals of PO, it would be unwise to initiate a project (a new well, for example) that would benefit only one side of the conflict.⁴¹ However, if by understanding human dynamics it could be known that such a project would win the support of the population to the peace process and away from those seeking to derail it, that project could instead be used as a means to isolate spoilers. After all, the principle of impartiality applies only to the legitimate parties to the peace process, and using a method such as this would also help to support the principle of

minimum use of force. For example, in one case from Afghanistan, the Taliban was driven completely out of one village by the villagers themselves after the on-site HTT encouraged coalition forces to buy a volleyball net for the local people. Without a single shot being fired, that simple act eroded every shred of support the Taliban had enjoyed in that village.⁴²

Beyond isolation of spoilers, general disarmament of the population and belligerents is an effective method to support the peace process and reduce violence. However, disarmament, if it is necessary, must be done cautiously, because in many societies, it is customary for the men to be armed.⁴³ Forced disarmament could prove a point of friction, especially if mandated and executed by foreign forces. Instead, the orders to disarm would be better received if given by respected local leaders.⁴⁴ The disarmament may also need to be selective, as there is often a critical but potentially unclear difference between weapons necessary for work or survival, and weapons used solely for fighting.⁴⁵ This precise situation existed during UN peace operations in Darfur (UNAMID), where arms control, or the lack of it, was a serious difficulty which undermined much of the peace effort. The problem was complicated by the presence of nomadic tribes, such as the *Janjaweed*, which, as herdsmen living off the land, require their weapons for survival and for their livelihoods.⁴⁶ Forcing arbitrary disarmament upon such a group would risk, at best, biasing them against the peace process, and perhaps, at worst, spawning additional spoilers. A study of local customs, as conducted by the commander's HTT, is an ideal method to ascertain whether or not these distinctions exist in a given society, and then to identify the exceptions that must exist in order to avoid "the imposition of foreign norms"⁴⁷ on a population by making erroneous assumptions.

Engagement with key local leaders, so important to the process of disarmament, must also extend into every other aspect of the operation, such as aiding in communication with the populace. Peace operations can only gain true legitimacy if conducted with the assent of the host nation,⁴⁸ thus making it essential that commanders make efforts to ascertain which local leaders must be involved in the operation in order to give it the greatest chance for success.⁴⁹ The process of identifying, locating, and ultimately selecting these leaders can be problematic, because selecting respected local leaders, while critical to gaining the support of the populace, could also lead to jealousies and petty squabbles among other local organizations or leaders.⁵⁰ Avoiding this complication is a function ideally suited to the skill set employed by a HTT, which can study traditional local power structures and conduct analysis of the social networks to identify with whom the commander should interface and in what capacities.⁵¹ As part of that process of identifying these key leaders, HTT members build relationships with them, including those who may previously have been considered bad actors or spoilers,⁵² in order to facilitate introductions with the peace force commander. Finding key leaders is only the first step, however, and is of little use unless they can then be understood, contacted, and involved in the PO, but commanders are cautioned to “ascertain party affiliations of the persons you are in contact with.”⁵³ This plays to another core function of a HTT, to prepare “the commander for key leader engagements.”⁵⁴

Conflict resolution, much like disarmament, is especially important when conditions are tense and tentative, where local clashes carry the risk of derailing the peace process, and thus must be handled carefully.⁵⁵ Where strategic commanders and diplomats may be directly involved in the formation of provincial governments, operational commanders can find themselves obligated to deal with local squabbles. This was typical of PO in Darfur, where

conflicts arose from disputes surrounding the migratory routes of nomadic clansmen and the resulting ecological consequences for local farmers.⁵⁶ A seemingly simple boundary dispute could potentially escalate from shouting to shooting and beyond, especially where deep-seated tensions are barely being contained by a tentative peace arrangement. In order for the solutions to these conflicts to contribute to a lasting general peace process, small disputes are best handled in accordance with local customs and practices to give the population a sense of ownership and self-determination. A HTT employed by the local commander will assist in understanding culturally appropriate mechanisms for helping to resolve conflicts before they can become large enough to affect the peace he is working to keep.⁵⁷

This sense of ownership by the populace is further reinforced by the inclusion of local public institutions and systems and ensuring they are adequately represented.⁵⁸ Including them in the process also helps these institutions gain the necessary popular legitimacy to materially support the lasting peace. The peace process and the peace force itself also earn credibility⁵⁹ for recognizing and giving voice to valuable and important aspects of society beyond and below the level of elite government leaders. For example, in Iraq HTTs are credited with helping their field commanders identify, understand, engage, support and empower local municipal councils and community organizations, with the result that the population perceives significant legitimacy in the newly created local and national governments.⁶⁰ There, HTT members recognized an excellent opportunity to distance the stability forces from the role of governance. The team convinced a brigade commander that the distribution of relief supplies would have a synergistic effect if they were handed out by the local indigenous authorities rather than an American Provincial Reconstruction Team. In either case, the population would benefit by receiving the necessary supplies. However, by

allowing the locals to distribute them in a manner consistent with local tradition – by tribal consensus – they achieved a more equitable distribution of supplies, while at the same time gaining credibility for the new government in the eyes of the local population, who saw it successfully fulfilling its civic duties.⁶¹

The perception of peace force legitimacy is rooted strongly in its relationship to the local population and is essential to its effectiveness. Whether regarding its ability to provide adequate security or to effectively convey its own impartiality toward their concerns in the conflict, the actions a peace force undertakes must be conducted with an eye toward the effects they are likely to have, or could potentially have, upon the population. A Commander's HTT provides a vital link between the population and military planners to assist in considering and predicting these effects upon the population in order to maximize the effectiveness of PO. To do this, HTTs are tasked to not just identify possible effects of potential COAs, but to effectively think further down the road by extrapolating those effects to the second and third orders,⁶² and then to apply the culturally-based logic of their predictions to represent possible popular responses during the process of selecting, wargaming and refining COAs.⁶³

The key to gaining public support for peace operations will likely hinge on the ability of the peace force to effectively communicate with the population. Engaging local key leaders is fundamental to assuring the public of the legitimacy of a PO,⁶⁴ but that engagement is of little value unless the message actually reaches the general population. To best convey an intended message to a target population, it must be relevant to the receivers in some way, and most especially in the cultural context of their daily lives.⁶⁵ As Secretary Gates has observed, "it is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its

message,”⁶⁶ especially for the nation that brought the world Hollywood and the Internet.

Throughout a PO in Sudan, the local radio station, Radio MIRAYA was used as the primary means of reaching the population, and yet it broadcast its message only in English and Arabic, and therefore reached only a portion of the population.⁶⁷ HTTs study the cultural dynamics and distributions of local languages; from this they can determine the best method of reaching the population.

Finally, if there needs to be a strong emphasis in PO on influencing the public, for the sake of future planning and refocusing efforts when necessary, there must also be an equally strong emphasis on measuring the effectiveness of this effort. In dealing predominantly with intangible matters, such as influence, rather than tangible factors, such as enemy casualties, it is important to assess effectiveness through indicators which suggest underlying attitudes, rather than solely by raw data.⁶⁸ However, indicators can be difficult to understand, and interpreting them requires expert, culturally-based analysis.⁶⁹ HTTs are designed for this function, as they are tasked to help determine which measures of effectiveness (MOEs) will accurately represent the situation to the commander, review and recommend adjustments to standing programs of MOEs as the situation evolves, and then assist in providing the expert analysis to glean accurate assessment of the data.⁷⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

U.S. doctrine identifies fifteen fundamentals for the success of PO, all of which are influenced in some manner by culturally-sensitive considerations, yet that same doctrine has yet to incorporate specific guidance regarding the use of human terrain teams. While this deficiency is due certainly to the youth of the program, it should be rectified quickly to ensure commanders at all levels are aware of this valuable resource at their disposal.

Precisely because this program and its capabilities are so new, few commanders are aware of what it can do for them. U.S. military doctrine for PO must be reviewed and updated at the earliest opportunity to incorporate HTS into the processes of planning and execution.

The human terrain teams that form the core functional elements of HTS are uniquely and ideally placed to give every operational military commander the knowledge, understanding, interpretation, and analysis so critical to most effectively prosecute his missions. Unfortunately, the program is still small, and barely beyond the test and evaluation phase – there are currently only 29 of these invaluable nine-man teams available world-wide. The program must be expanded as soon as possible to ensure that operational commanders will quickly be able to draw on the resources they need in time-critical and potentially unexpected situations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed analysis of the exact number of teams required to adequately meet the needs of the force. However, such a force-planning study should be conducted by policymakers at the earliest opportunity.

Peace operations are an increasing reality.⁷¹ This trend will continue for at least the foreseeable future, and operational commanders at all levels and around the globe can expect to encounter them at least occasionally, if not frequently. The operating environments of today, particularly in modern PO, are increasingly to be found in population centers rather than vast expanses of open terrain, and as a result, the features of those environments are defined as much by people and human dynamics as they are by rivers, valleys, hills, or weather. As it will always be in peace operations, “the focus of all civil and military plans and operations must be on the center of gravity in any conflict— the country’s people and their belief in and support of their government.”⁷²

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